



S. Walter Raleigh K<sup>t</sup>



S. Walter Ralegh K<sup>t</sup>

# MAXIMS OF STATE.

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*written by*  
Sir WALTER RALBIGH.

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Whereunto is added  
His *Instructions* to his  
S O N N E;

A N D  
*The Son's Advice to his*  
*Aged Father.*  $\frac{x}{x}$

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L O N D O N,

Printed by *W. Bentley*, and are to be  
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M A



# MAXIMS OF STATE.

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## OF GOVERNMENT.



GOVERNMENT is of two sorts. 1. *Private*, of himself. *Sobriety*. Of his Family; called *Oeconomic*.

2. *Publick*, of the Common-wealth; called *Politick*. A man must first Govern himself, e're he be fit to govern a Family: And his Family, e're he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth.

B

of

## of Policie.

**P**OLICIE is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth, and some part of it according to that State, or form of Government wherein it is settled for the publick good.

*State*, is the frame or set order of a Common-wealth, or of the Governours that rule the same, specially of the chief and Sovereign Governour that commandeth the rest.

The State or Sovereignty consisteth in 5. points.

1. Making or annulling of Laws.
2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates.
3. Power over life and death.
4. Making of War, or Peace.
5. Highest or last appeal.

Where these five are, either in one or in more, there is the State.

These five points of State, rest either in,


1. One *Monarchie* or Kingdom.
2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdom, called an *Aristocracie*.
3. Many, called a *Free-State*, or *Popular State*.

These three sorts of Government have



have respect to the common good, and therefore are just, and lawful States.

These 3. degenerate into 3. other Governments. *viz.*



These all respect their own, and not the publick good, and therefore are called Bastard Governments.

I.

*Monarchie.*

**A** Monarchie, or Kingdom, is the Government of a State by one Head, or chief, tending to the common benefit of all.

*Monarchie, or Kingdoms*, are of three sorts touching the right, or possession of them; *viz.*

1. *Hereditarie*, by descent, as the *English, French, &c.*

2. *Elective*, by suffrage of the other *Orders*, or some of them, as the *Polonian*.

3. *Mixt*, or of both kinds; *viz.* by Descent, yet not tyed to the next of blood, as the ancient *Jewish State*.

*Monarchies* are of two sorts touching their power or authority; *viz.*

1. *Intire*. Where the whole power of ordering all *State* matters, both in peace and war, doth by law and custom appertain to the Prince, as in the *English Kingdom*, where the Prince hath power to make *Laws, League, and War*; To create *Magistrates*; to pardon life: Of appeal, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making *Laws*, yet ever subject to the Princes pleasure, nor Negative will.

2. *Limited or restrained*, that hath no full power in all the points or matters of *State*, as the *Military King* that hath not the *Sovereignty* in time of peace, as the making of *Laws, &c.* But in War onely, as the *Polonian Kings*.

II. *Ari-*

## II.

*Aristocracie, or Senatorie State.*

**A**N *Aristocracie* is the Government of a Commonwealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the publick good.

*Aristocracies* are of three sorts, viz. Where the *Senatours* are chosen, for 1. *Virtue*, *Riches*, and the Common good, as the *Venetian*.

2. *Virtue* and the publick good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the *Roman*, when some of the *Senatours* were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schools.

3. *Virtue* and wealth, more respecting their private, than their publick good, which inclineth towards an *Oligarchie*, or the Government of the Richer or nobler sort, as in *Rome* towards the end.

## III.

*Free-State, or Popular State.*

**T**HE *Popular State* is the Government of a *State* by the choiser sort of people, tending to the publick good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.

In every *Just State*, some part of the Government is, or ought to be imparted to the People; As in a Kingdom, a voice or suffrage in making Lawes; and sometimes also, in levying of Arms (if the charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in Judicial matters, may in part be referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state, or kind of Government: And where the multitude is discontented, there must needs be many enemies to the present *State*. For which cause, Tyrants,  
(which

(which allow the people, no manner of dealing in *State* matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other means whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in *Russland, Turkey, &c.*

## IV.

*Tyranny.*

**A** *Tyranny* is the swerving, or distorting of a *Monarchie*, or the Government of one, tending not to the publick good, but the private benefit of himself, and his followers. As in the *Russe* and *Turkish* Government, where the *State* and *wealth* of other others, are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Emperor. This is the worst of all the *Bastard States*, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a *Monarchie*, which resembleth the Sovereign Government of God himself.

## V.

*Oligarchie, or the Government of a few.*

**A** *N Oligarchie* is the swerving, or the corruption of an *Aristocracie*,

or the Government of some few, that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without any respect of the publick good. The chief end of these *Governours*, is, their own greatness and enriching. And therefore their manner is, to prepare fit means to uphold their Estates. This *State* is not wholly so bad, as is the *Tyrannie*, and yet worse than the *Common-wealth*, because it respecteth the good of a few.

## V I.

*Common-wealth.*

**A** *Common-wealth* is the swerving or depravation of a *Free, or popular State*, or the Government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other Orders.

These two *States*, to wit; *The Oligarchie*, and *Common-wealth*, are very adverse the one to the other, and have many bickerings between them. For that the richer or nobler sort, suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect, because they are superiour, but in some respects onely, to wit, in Riches, Birth, Parentage, &c. On the other side, the *Common-people* suppose, there ought to be an equality

equality in all other things, and some *State matters*, because they are equal with the Rich or Noble, touching their *Libertie*, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour, as touching *Government* and fitness thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, &c. But because they are *wise, Virtuouse, Valiant, &c.* and so have fit parts to *Govern a State*.

These several *States* are sometimes mixed, and inter-wrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the *Roman State*, the people had their *Plebiscita*, and gave the suffrage in the election of *Magistrates*: Yet the *Senate* (as the *State* stood) for the most part swayed the *State*, and bare the chief rule. So in the *Venetian State*, the Duke seemeth to represent a *Monarch*, and the *Senate* to be his *Council*: Yet the Duke hath no power in *State matters*, but is like a head set on by art, that beareth no brain. And so that *State* is *Senatorial or Aristocratical*.

## Causes of States & Commonwealths in general.

Causes of States or of Commonwealths are of 3. sorts, viz.	{	1. Founding, or settling a State where to be considered.	{	1. Measure.
		2. Preserving a State.		2. Parts, & their Qualities.
		3. Changing, and altering a State.		

### Founding a State.

In founding a State are to be considered 2. things.	{	1. Proportion.
		2. Parts.

**P**roportion, is a Just Measure or *Mediocratie* of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that Order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind, to wit, so that a Monarch be not too Monarchical, nor strict, or absolute, as the *Russe* Kings; nor *Aristocratical*, that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobility, as the *Scottish* Kingdom, but ever respective to the other degrees. That *Aristocratie* be not too magnificent nor injure to it self, but communi-



communicate with the people some commodities of *State* or *Government*, as the *Venetian*, and sometimes the *Roman* allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make *Plebiscita*, &c. So a *Free-State* or *Common-wealth* that it be not over popular, *viz.* That it depress not too much the richer, wiser, nor learned sort; but admit them to offices with a *Caution* out of the rules and mysteries of that *State*. That they seek no alteration of the present *State*. The reason, because the moderate *States* in their several kinds (as all other things that observe the mean) are best framed for their continuance, because they give less cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the *Wealth*, *Honour*, and *Libertie* which they see in others that govern the *State*; And so are less subject to stirs and commotions, and easiest kept in their present *State* wherein they are set.

*Parts.*

**T**HE *Parts* of the *State*, or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick *Government*.

*Parts* or *Partakers* of *Publick Government*, &c

1. *Council or Senate*, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace, Magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care, that they may be men expert in *matter of Policie*, because it is their *Trade and Vocation*, as men use to chuse Pilots, and Masters of Ships, such as know the Art of *Navigation*, and not Husband-men, &c. And so the contrary.

2. *Magistrates and Officers*, which are to be executioners of that which is consulted, and found to be expedient for the *Common-wealth*, wherein are to be observed, the kinds of Magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of *Government*; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen.

3. *Judges*; To determine in *Civil*, and *Criminal matters*, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner of *Judgement*, and *Judicial proceeding*.

1. *Superiour*,  
which are to be  
such & of that  
kind as agree  
with the *State*,  
as *Consuls* for a  
year, and not  
perpetual *Dic-  
tators* in a *Se-  
natorie State*.  
*Prætors*, & *Cen-  
sors*, that over-  
see manners &  
orders of the  
people.

For a King-  
dom *Lieute-  
nant* of *Shires*,  
*Marshals*, *Ma-  
sters of Horse*,  
*Admirals*, &c.

*Inferiour*, as  
*conservators* of  
*Peace*, *Consta-  
bles*, &c.

*Overseers* of  
youth, that take  
care for their  
education for  
civil & warlike  
exercise.

*clarks*

1. *Kinds*  
of *Ma-  
gistrats*  
as,

> 1. *Civil* <

In *Ma-  
gistrates*  
are to  
be ob-  
served.

*Clarks* of the Market that provide for the quantity, and price of victual.

*Ediles* for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

*Questours*, or *Treasurers*, to keep and dispende the publick Treasury.

*Aſſuaries*, or *Recorders*, which keep the publick Records.

*Gaolers*, to keep prisons and Prisoners.

*Surveyours* of woods and fields, &c.

2. Ec-  
clesia-  
ſtical.

1. As *Bishops* or *Pastours*, *Elders*, *Wardens*.

2. *Time of Magistrates*, whereof some are perpetual, some for a time, viz. for more years, a year, half a year, according to the necessity of the *Common-wealth*, and not perpetual; or at least not *Hereditary* in a Kingdom. Yearly in an *Aristocracie*, or half yearly

yearly in a *Free-State*.

3. *Manner* of choise, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by *suffrage*, and not by *Lot*.

### *Causes preserving a State, or Commonwealth.*

In preserving of States, 2. things required.	1. <i>Mysteries, or Sophisms.</i>	1. <i>General to all States.</i> 2. <i>Particular, for every several State.</i>
	2. <i>Rules, or Actions.</i>	1. <i>General, for all States.</i> 2. <i>Particular, for every State.</i>

### *Mysteries, or Sophisms.*

**M***ysteries, or Sophisms of State*, are certain secret practises, either for the avoyding of danger, or averting such effects as tend to the preservation

vation of the present *State*, as it is set or founded.

*State Mysteries* are of two sorts.

I. *General*: That pertain to all *States*; as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree, or part of the *Common-wealth*, do not exceed both in *Quantity* and *Quality*. In *Quantity*, as that the number of the *Nobility*, or of great persons, be not more, than the *State* or *Common-wealth* can beare. In *Quality*, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more than it is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the Scale: So in *Common-wealths*, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in *Quality*, and *Quantity*, overwayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations, and conversions of *State*. Secondly, to provide by all means, that the middle sort of People exceed both the extreames, (*viz.*) of *Nobility* and *Gentry*, and the base rascal, and begarly sort. For this maketh the *State* constant and firm, when both the *Extreames* are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and begarly sort together, it is not to be feared. To these two points, the *Particular*

lar

lar rules or *Sophisms* of every *Common-wealth*, are to be applied.

2. *Particular*: That serve for preservation of every *Common-wealth*, in that form of *State* wherein it is settled as in a Kingdom. That the *Nobility* may be accustomed to bear the government of the *Prince*, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the *Princes* eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the *Princes Court*, under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see, and enjoy their presence; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to be attendant upon the *Prince*, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the *Prince*, and be as *Hostages* for the good behaviour, and faithfull dealing of their Parents, especially, if they be of any suspected note. To that end serves the *Persian* practise, in having a Band, or Train of the *Satrapa's* children, and other Nobles to attend the Courts which was well imitated by our Train of *Henchmen*, if they were of the Nobler sort. Again, sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow greater  
greater

greater sums and never pay : So in an *Oligarchy*, least it decline to a *Popular State*, they deceive the people with this and the like *Sophisms*, (*viz.*) They compel their own sort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalries, to frequent their Assemblies for choosing of Magistrates, for provision of Armour, war-like Exercises, making an Execution of Laws, &c. By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer, but to suffer the poorer, and meaner sort to be absent, and to neglect those Assemblies under pretence, that they will not draw them from their business, and private earnings, : Yet withall to cite thither some few of them, (*viz.*) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort, to make a shew, that they would have the people or poorer sort, partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies, with the tediousness of consultations, greatness of Fines, if they should mis-do, to the end, to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with those Consultations; by which means, the richer sort do still govern the State, with the peoples liking, and good contentment. *James*



*Axioms.*

- Axioms*  
or *Rules*  
of pre-  
serving  
the *State*  
are,
- 1. *General*, that serve for all  
*Common-wealths*.
  - 2. *Particular*, that serve for  
every *several State*.

*General Rules.*

1. **T**He first and principal *Rule of Po-  
licie* to be observed in all *States*,  
is to profess, and practise, and main-  
tain the true worship and *Religion* of  
Almighty God prescribed unto us  
in his word, which is the chief end of  
all government. The *Axiom*, That  
God be obeyed simply without excep-  
tion, though he command that which  
seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to  
*Humane policy*; as in the *Jews Common-  
wealth*, That all the men should repair  
yearly to one place to worship God  
four times, leaving none to defend  
their coast, though being beset with  
many Enemies. Not to sow the seventh  
year, but to suffer the ground to rest  
untilled without respect or fear of sa-  
mine, &c.

2. To

2. To avoid the causes of *Conversions*, whereby *States* are over-thrown, that are set down in the Title of conversions; For that *Common-wealths* (as natural bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and *State* thereof, and are so cured by contrary medicines.

3. To take heed, that no *Magistrate* be created or continued contrary to the Laws and policy of that *State*. As that in a *Senate*, there be not created a perpetual *Dictator*, as *Cesar* in *Rome*. In a Kingdom, that there be no *Senate*, or *Convention* of equal power with the Prince in *State* matters, as in *Poland*.

4. To create such *Magistrates* as love the *State* as it is settled, and take heed of the contrary practise, as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom, or *Aristocracie*. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present *State*.

5. To that end to have certain Officers to pry abroad, and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort, agreeable to the present *State*, but desire rather to be under some other form, or kind of government.

6. To

6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to be observed in that *Common-wealth* which is governed by a few of the richer sort; For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his *Common Fees*, the common sort, and such as want honour, take in good part that they be not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business. But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters, the common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debar'd of those preferments, and of that gain they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the *German Oligarchies* continue so firm; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the richer sort are by that means freed, and secured from being under the poor.

7. To take heed that the State, as it is settled and maintained, be not over-strict, nor exceed in his kind; (*viz.*) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchical, nor a *Popular State* too Popular: For which cause it is good, that the Magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts, though  
in-

inferiour for place and Office; And sometimes popularly with the common people, which is the cause that some *Common-wealths*, though they be very simply, and unskilfully set, yet continue firm, because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely, and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour, and therefore some kind of *Moderate Popularity* is to be used in every *Common-wealth*.

8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaking and altering of Lawes, as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several *State*. For the disease and alteration of a *Common-wealth*, doth not happen all at once, but grows by degrees, which every common wit cannot discern, but men expert in **POLICIE**.

9. To provide, that that part be ever the greater in number and power, which favours the *State* as now it stands. This is to be observed as a very Oracle in all *Common-wealths*.

10 To observe a mean in all the degrees, and to suffer no part to exceed, or decay over much. As first for prefer-

ferments, to provide that they be rather small and short; than great and long; and if any be grown to overmuch greatness, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the *Sophisms* are to be practised (*viz.*) to do it by parts and degrees; to do it by occasion, or colour of law, and not all at once. And if that way serve not, to advance some other, of whose virtue and faithfulness, we are fully assured, to as high a degree, or to a greater honour; and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) be more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the *Sophisms* of a *Popular State*, *viz.* to send him on Embassages, and Forreign Negotiations, or imploy him in some Office that hath great charges, and little honour, &c. To which end, the *Edileship* served in some Commonwealths.

11. To suppress the Factions, and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keep order that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and Factions.

12. To

12 To increase or remit the common Taxes and Contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the People and *Common-wealth*. If the people be increased in Wealth, the Taxes and Subsidies may be increased. If they be poor, and their Wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of Traffick, &c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions, or to take little. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The *Sophisms* that serve for Impositions, are these, and other of like sort, to pretend business of great charge, as War, building of Ships, making of Havens, Castles, Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises, wherein some part may be bestowed, the rest reserved for other expences; but Princely dealings needs no pretences.

13 To Provide that the *Discipline & Training* of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that *Common-wealth*: As that in a Kingdom, the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court, that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the Prince: In the *Senatory State*, that the sons of the *Senatours* be not idly, nor over dain-

daintily brought up, but well instructed and trained up in *Learning, Tongues, and Martial Exercise*; that they may be able to bear that place in the Commonwealth, which their Father held, and contrariwise, in a *Popular State*,

14. To take heed, least their *Sophisms*, or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that State, be not discovered; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used, and with great secrecy.

### *Particular Rules.*

*Rules and Axioms, for*

preserving of a Kingdom.	{	<i>Hereditary.</i>
		<i>Conquered.</i>

*Kingdoms Hereditary, are preserved at home by the ordering,*

1. **H**imself; viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Power and Prerogative. For the less and more temperate their Power and State is, the more firm, and stable is their

their Kingdom and Government; because they seem to be further off from a Master-like, and *Tyrannical Empire*; and less unequal in condition to the next degree, to wit, the *Nobility*, and so less subject to grudge and envy.

2. *Nobility, viz.* By keeping that degree and due *proportion*, that neither they exceed in number more than the Realm, or *State* can bear, as the *Scottish* Kingdom, and sometime the *English*, when the Realm was overcharged with the number of *Dukes*, *Earls*, and other *Nobles*; whereby the *Authority of the Prince* was eclipsed, and the Realm troubled with their *Factions and Ambitions*. Nor that any one excell in Honour, Power, or wealth, as that he resemble another King within the Kingdom, as the house of *Lancaster* within this Realm. To that end, not to load any with too much Honour or preferment, because it is hard even for the best; and worthiest men, to bear their greatness, and high Fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all *States*. The *Sophism* for preventing, or reforming this inconvenience, are to be used with great caution and wisdom. If any

great



great person be to be abated , not to deal with him by *calumniation*, or *forged matter*, & so to cut him off without desert, especially if he be gracious among the people, after the *Machiavilian Policie*, which besides the injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once, which maketh a desperate *Discontentment* in the party, and a commiseration in the peole, and so greater love, if he be gracious for his virtue, and publick service. Nor to banish him into forreign Countries, where he may have opportunity of practising with *Forreign States*, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the example of *Coriolanus*, *Henry the fourth*, and such like. But to use these, and the like *Sophisms*, viz. To abate their greatness by degrees, as *David Joabs*, *Iustinian Bellisarius*, &c. To advance some other Men to as great, or greater Honour, to shadow, or over-mate the greatness of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends, and followers by *preferments*, *rewards*, and other good and lawfull means; especially, to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of

the *Common-wealth*, whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the *State*.

3. *People*, viz. So to order and behave himself, that he be loved, and revered of the *People*. For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies, or foreign Invasion, if he be firmly loved of his own people. The reason, for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise, nor any refuge, being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended, hath cause to fear every moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt; viz. if he seem as a *Tutor*, or a *Father* to love the people, and to protect them, if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom; For that nothing is more popular, nor more pleasing to the people, than is peace.

4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously, yet with *State* and *Majesty* to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliants, and such like.

5. If he sit himself sometimes in open Courts, and place of Justice, that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people. If he bestow many benefits and graces upon that City, which he maketh the seat of his Empire, and so make it sure and faithfull unto him, which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the Sun in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his Dominions, and least the furthest parts at one end move, whilst the Prince is in the other. If he go in progress many times to see his Provinces, especially, those that are remote.

6. If he gratifie his Courtiers and Attendants in that sort, and by such means, as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with *monopolies*, and such like.

7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seem grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are gratefull, and well pleasing to himself, as the French Kings, who for that purpose, as may seem, have erected their Court at Pa-

ris, which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the Nobles and the People.

8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the same justly without *defalcation* of any part by his Exchequer, or other Officer.

9. If he avoid all such things as may breed *hatred*, or *contempt* of his person, which may be done, if he shew himself not too *light*, *inconstant*, *hard*, *cruel*, *effeminate*, *fearfull*, and *dastardly*, &c. But contrarywise, *Religious*, *Grave*, *Just* *Valiant*, &c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the *Machiavilian Politie*, with far the bet-means to keep the people in obedience, than love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.

10 If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike provision, which is to be rumoured, and made known abroad: if it be known, that he is revered, and obeyed by his peoples at home.

11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him, that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Dominion; which if it happen, he is to joyn speedily with other Princes, which  
are

are in like danger to abate that greatness, and to strengthen himself and the rest against it. An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain.

12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other means, to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince, with whom he hath differences, if any thing be intended against his State. Or at least have some of his own Lydging abroad, about that Princes Court, under colour of Embassage, or some other pretence; which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn.

13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey, and not to encounter them with his *Prerogative*, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts, especially if it tender to take from them *their commodities*, and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERs and *Ministers*.

14. To provide especially, That that part, which favoureth the State as it standeth, be more potent, than the other which favoureth it not, or desireth a change.

15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of *Magistrates*, especially, of such as assist the Prince in his *Counsels*, and *Polities*, and not to lean over much to his own advise, contrarie to the rule of *Machiavil*, who teacheth, That a Prince can have no good counsel, except it be in himself; his reason, because if he use the counsel of some one, he is in danger to be over-wrought, and supplanted by him; & if he counsel with more, Then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions. As if a Prince of great, or mean wisdom, could not take the Judgement of all his Counsellors in any point of *Policie*, or of so many as the himself thinketh good, and to take it either by word, or in writing; and himself then in private peruse them all, and so after good and mature deliberation, make choice of the best, without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one. For the Proverb is true, that two eyes see more than one; and therefore the advises, and Consultations of a *Senatory State*, is compared by some to a Feast, or dinner, where many contribute towards the *shot*, by which means they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare; and yet every man may make choice of that

that dish, that serveth him best for his  
health and appetite.

16. The Prince himself is to sit  
sometimes in place of publique ju-  
stice, and to give an experiment of his  
wisdom and equity, whereby great re-  
verence and estimation is gotten, as in  
the example of Solomon, which may  
seem the reason, why our Kings of En-  
gland had their Kings Bench in place  
of publick Justice, after the manner of  
the ancient Kings that sat in the Gate;  
where for better performing of this  
Princely duty, some special causes may  
be selected, which may thoroughly be  
debated and considered upon by the  
Prince in private, with the help and ad-  
vise of his learned Councel, and so be  
decided publicly, as before is said,  
by the Prince himself; At least, the  
Prince is to take account of every Mi-  
nister of publick Justice, that it may  
be known, that he hath a care of Ju-  
stice, and doing right to his people,  
which makes the Justicers also to be  
more careful in performing of their  
duties.

17. To be moderate in his Taxes,  
and impositions; and when need doth  
require so use the Subjects purse, so  
to do it by Parliaments, and with their

consents, making the cause apparent unto them, and shewing his unwillingness in charging them. Finally, so to use it, that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects, than an exaction by him.

18. To stop small beginnings; unto this end to compound the dissensions that arise amongst the Nobles, with caution, that such as are free be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole *Common-wealth* set in a combustion; as in the example of the *Barons Wars*, and the late Wars of *France*, which grew from a quarrel betwixt the *Guision Faction*, and the other *Nobility*.

19. To stir up the people, if they grow secure, and negligent of *Armour*, and other provision for the *Common-wealth*, by some rumour or fear of danger at home, to make more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldom to be used, least it be supposed a false Alarm, when there is need indeed.

20. To have special care, that his children, especially, the heir apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King, viz. in learning, specially of mat-



matters pertaining to *State*, and in Martial exercise, contrary to the practise of many Princes, who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting, &c. which by reason of their defects, afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of *State*.

## II.

*Kingdoms new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these means.*

- I. **F**irst, if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions, as have his own Countrey, it is an easie matter to retain such Countries within their obedience, in case the Princes blood of the said countrey be wholly extinct. For men of the same quality, tongue, and condution, do easily shole, and combine themselves together, so much the rather, if the people of that countrey have served before, and were not accustomed to their own Liberty, wherein specially is to be observed.

served, that the laws and customs of that purchased Countrey be not altered nor innovated, or at least it be done by little and little. So the *Burgundians* and *Acquitains* were annexed to France. The reason, because partly they have been accustomed to serve, and partly, for that they will not easily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the *Bloud Royall* be once extinguished. As for the invasion of a foreign Countrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living, it is not the part of a just Civil Prince, much less a Prince Christian to enforce such a countrey; and therefore, the *Machiavellian* practises in this case, to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the *Bloud Royall*, is lewd and impertinent: The like is to be said of murdering the Natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end he may hold the rest in sure possession. A thing not onely against *Christian Religion*, but it is inhumane injustice, cruel, and barbarous.

2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some other place, and our Colonies, consisting of so many as shall be thought meet.

meet, be planted there in some part of the Province, Castles, Ports, and Havens, seized upon and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Babylonian Monarch, which Transplanted 10. Jews: And of the Romans in France, Tribes of the Germany, Britany, and other places. The reason:

1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot, are to be maintained within the Province, which cannot be done without great charge.
2. For that the whole Province is troubled and grieved with removing and supplying the Army with victuals, carriages, &c.
3. For that Colonies are more sure and faithful, than the rest.

As for the Natives that are removed from their former seats, they have no means to hurt; and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to be quiet.

The Turks practise in Asia, where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the Soldiers, whom

whom they call, *Timariota*.

That the Prince have his seat and his residence, in his new purchase, especially, for a time, till things be well settled; especially, if the *Province* be great and large, as the *Turks* in *Greece*: The reason;

1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects.
2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes presence, if they be oppressed by the Lieutenants, and inferiour Governours: Where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts, that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression.
3. Because being present, he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, he cannot do, or not do in time.
4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new pur-

purchases be committed to such as be sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Princes favour, and not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious for their *Nobility*, or *Virtue*; especially, if the *Province* be great, and somewhat far distant, which may soon seduce the unsettled affections of those new subjects. As for such *Governours*, as depend wholly upon the Princes favour, being not born, but created *Noble*, they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty, and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers, to keep them in Subjection, and not for any ill will.

4. To have the children of the chief Noble men, and of greatest Authority, Hostages with them in safe keeping, the more the better: For that no bound is stronger, than that of nature, to contain the Parents and Allies in obedience, and they the rest.

5. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing

blissing of the present Govern-  
ment.

6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable, and well affected so much as may be, that they may seem by being conquered, to have gotten a protector, rather than a Tyrant; For the common-people, if they enjoy peace, and be not distracted nor drawn from their busines, nor excited upon beyond measure, are easily contained under obedience; Yet notwithstanding, they are to be disused from the practise of Arms, and other Exercises which increase courage, and be weakened of Armour, that they have neither spirit, nor will to rebel.

7. If there be any faction in the Country, to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part, and to combine with it, as Cæsar in France.

8. To look well to the borders, and adjoining Provinces, and if any rule there of great, or equal power to himself, to join league with some other strangers, though of less strength, to hinder the attempts (if any should be) by such neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a Country infected by one neighbour Prince, collecteth in

another, of as great, or greater power, to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the Romans were called into Greece, by the *Aetolians*; the Saxons, by the *Britains*, the Danes, by the *Saxons*.

9. To leave their Titles and dignities to the Natives, but the command and Authority, wholly to his own.

10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the *Sophisms* of Policy, especially those that appertain to a Tyrannical State, which are soon detected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser, and better sort of his subjects, whereof must needs follow very ill effects.

The *Sophisms* of Tyrants, are rather to be known, than practised, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannical States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

### *Rules Polstick of Tyrants.*

**R**ules practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts. Viz.

1. *Barbarous*, and *Practised*, which is pro-

proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves, without others help, as in the *Turkish*, and *Russe* Government.

2. *Sophistical*, and *Dissembled*; As in some States that are repured for good and lawfull *Monarchies*, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet settled, nor have power sufficient of themselves; but must use the power and help of others, and so are forced to be Politick *Sophisters*.

## I:

*Sophisms of a Barbarous and  
professed Tyranny.*

**T**O expel and banish out of his countrey all honest means, whereby his people may attain to learning, wisdom, valour, and other virtues, that they might be fit for that estate, and servile condition. For that these two, learning, and martial exercise, effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: *viz.* Wisdom, and Valour. For that men of spirit and understanding, can hardly endure a Servile State.

To



To this end, to forbid learning of liberal Arts, and Martial exercise; As in the *Russe Government*, so *Julian the Apostata* dealt with the Christians. Contrarywise, to use his people to base occupations, and Mechanical Arts, to keep them from idleness, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted, and so made unfit for great enterprises. So the *Egyptian Kings* dealt with the *Hebrews*; So the *Russe Emperour* with his *Russe* people: And *Charles the fifth* with the *Netherlanders*, when he purposed to enclose their Priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute Government.

2. To make sure to him, and his State, his *Military* men by reward, liberty, and other means, especially, his Guard, or *Prætorian Band*; That being partakers of the spoil and benefit, they make like that State, and continue firm to it; as the *Turk*, his *Janizaries*; the *Russe*, his *Bojarens*, &c.

3. To unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means, whereby they may

may resist his power; And to that end, to have his set and ordinary exactions, viz. Once in two, three, or four years, and sometimes yearly, as the *Turk* and *Russe*; who is wont to say, That his people must be used as his flock of sheep, viz. Their fleece taken from them, least it overtrade them, and grow too heavy; That they are like to his beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there be any of extraordinary wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the Tax come about, or upon some devised matter, to confiscate their goods, as the common practise is of the *Russe* and *Turk*.

4. To be still in Wars, to the end, his people may need a Captain; and that his Forces may be kept in practise, as the *Russe* doth yearly against the *Tartar*, *Polonian*, and *Swedde*, &c.

5. To cut off such as excel the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility; or be of a pregnant, or a spiring wit, & so are fearfull to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold Office, or any honour, but one-ly of him; as the *Turk*, his *Bashas*, and the *Russe*, his *Ruezres*.

6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feasting, and other Assemblies among  
the

the people, that they have no means or opportunity to conspire, or confer together of publick matters, or to maintain love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the *Russes* practise.

7. To have their Beagles, or listeners in every corner, and parts of the Realm; especially, in places that are more suspect, to learn what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, & take away such as mislike their State.

8. To make Schism, and Division among his Subjects, viz. To set one Noble man, against another, and one Rich man against another, that through Faction & disagreement among themselves, they may be weakened, and attempt nothing against him, and by this means entertaining whisperings, and complaints, he may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the *Russe* made the Faction of the *Zemphy*, and the *Oppressorie*.

9. To have straggers for his Guard, and to entertain *Parasites*, and other base and servile fellows, not too wise, and yet subtle, that will be ready, for reward to do and execute what he com-

commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.

All these practises, and such like, may be contracted into one or two, viz. To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitation.

## I I.

*Sophisms of the Sophistical,  
or subtile Tyrant, to hold  
up his State.*

1. **T**O make shew of a good King, by observing a temper, and mediocritie in his Government, and whole course of life; To which end, it is necessary, That this subtile Tyrant, be a cunning Politician, or a Machiavilian at the least, and that he be taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and is thought thereby, not unworthy for to Govern others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and

and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, and habite, and other demeanour.

3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth ; And to that end, to seem loath to exact Tributes , and other Charges; and yet to make necessary of it, where none is: To that end, to procure such War as can bring no danger toward his State, and that might easily be compounded , or some other chargeable business ; and to continue it on, that he may continue his exacti- on and contribution so long as he list. And thereof to imploy some in his publick Service, the rest to hoord up in his Treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull Princes, as *Edward* the fourth in his Wars against *France*, when having levied a great sum of Money throughout his Realm, especially of the *Londoners* , he went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech, and publick writing, of the expence of such Taxes and Impositions, as he hath received of his subjects, that he may so seem to be a good Husband, and frugal, and not a robber of the Common-wealth.

5. To that end, to bestow some cost upon publick buildings, or some other work for the Common good, especially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his Realm, that so he may seem a benefactor, and have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey, or doing some good for it.

6. To forbid feasting, and other meetings, which increase love, and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses. To that end, the Curfew Bell was first ordained by *William the Conquerour*, to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour.

7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great, but rather, many equally great, that they may enyy, and contend one with another; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort, to do it waily, and by degrees; If quite to wreck him, and to have his life, yet to give him a lawfull tryal, after the manner of his Countrey; And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation, as to do him contumely, or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace, are things contrary unto Honour,

nour, which great spirits do most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, than to any thankfulness, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismission; True in *Atheists*, but not in true *Christian Nobilitie*.

8. To unarm his people, and store up their weapons, under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arm with them, such and so many as he shall think meet, and to commit them to such as are false men.

9. To make schism or division under hand among his Nobility, and bewixt the Nobility and the people, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine not together, and that himself by hearing the griefs and complaints, may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an account.

10. To offer no man any counsel, ly or wrong, specially, about womens matters, by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been the ruin of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of *Tar-*

*quinius*, by *Brutus*, *Appius*, by *Virginius*, *Pisistratus*, by *Harmodius*, *Alexander Medices*, Duke of Florence, *Alaisus* of *Placentia*, *Rodericus*, King of *Spain*, &c.

11. To that end, to be moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely, that he be not seen ; For that men sober , or watchfull , or such as seem so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies of their own.

12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize ; or do any special action for the Common-wealth , in that manner as it may seem, they could not be better regarded , in case they lived in a *Free-state*.

13. All rewards and things gratefull, to come from himself, but all punishments, exactions, and things ungratefull, to come from his Officers, & publick Ministers ; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he see his people discontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects.

14. To pretend great care of Religion, and of serving God, (which hath been the manner of the wickedest Ty.



Tyrants) for that people do less fear any hurt from those, whom they think Virtuous and Religious, nor attempt likely to do them hurt, for that they think that God protects them.

15. To have a strong & sure Guard of forreign Souldiers, and to bind them by good turns, that they having at least profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As *Caligula*, the *German* Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practised by Lawfull Kings, as by the *French* King.

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT, for their own safety.

17 To take part, and to joyn himself with the stronger part; if the Common people, and mean degree be the stronger, to joyn with them; if the Rich and Noble, to joyn with them. For so that part with his own strength, will be ever able to overmatch the other.

18. So to frame his manners & whole behaviour, as that he may seem, if

5<sup>a</sup> Sir Walter Rawleigh's  
not perfectly good, yet tolerably evil,  
or somewhat good, somewhat  
bad.

These Rules of Hypocritical Ty-  
rants, are to bee known, that  
they may be avoyded, and met  
withall, and not drawn into imi-  
tation.

*Preservation of an Ari-  
stocracie.*

**R**ules to preserve a *Senatory State*,  
are partly taken from the common  
Axioms, and partly from those that  
preserve a Kingdom.

*Preservation of an } Sophisms.  
Oligarchie, by { Rules.*

1. **I**N Consultations and Assemblies,  
about publick affairs, to order the  
matter, that all may have liberry  
to frequent their Common Assem-  
blies, and Councils, ; But to impose  
a Fine upon the richer sort, if they o-  
mit that duty. On the other side, to  
pardon the people, if they absent  
themselves, and to bear with them un-  
der

der pretence, that they may the better intend their Occupations, and not be hindered in their Trades, and earnings.

2. In Election of Magistrates, and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow, and abjure the bearing of Office, under colour of sparing them, or to enjoyn some great charge, as incident to the Office, which the poor cannot bear. But to impose some great Fine upon those, that be Rich, if they refuse to bear Office, being Elect unto it.

3. In judicial matters: In like manner to order, that the people may be absent from publick Trials, under pretence of following their business. But the Richer to be present, and to compel them by Fines, to frequent the Court.

4. In Warlike exercise and Arms: That the poor be not forced to have Armour, Horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exercises; but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor, Horse, &c. by excessive Fines, and to exercise themselves in War-like matters, &c.

5. To have special care of instructing their Children in liberal Arts, Politie, and Warlike exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as *Popular States* are preserved by the frequencie, and Liberty of the People, so this Government of the Richer, is preserved by discipline, and good order of *Governours*.

6. To provide good store of Warlike furniture, especially of *Horse*, and *Horse-men*, and of *Armed men*, viz. *Pike*, &c. which are proper to the gentry, as *shot*, and light furniture, are for a *Popular Company*.

7. To put in practise some points of a *Popular State*; viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment; To make yearly, or half years *Magistrates*, &c. For that the People are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatness, to abate him by the *Sophisms* fit for this State.

8. To commit the Offices and Magistracies, to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this State, and pleaseth the people, for that they reap some

re-

relief, and benefit by it.

9. To the same end, To contract marriages among themselves, the rich with the rich, &c.

10. In some things which concern not the *Points*, and *matters of State*, as Electing Magistrates, making Laws, &c. to give an equality; or sometimes a preferment to the Common People, and not to do, as in some *Oligarchies* they were wont; viz. To swear against the People, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary; To minister an Oath at their admission, That they shall do no wrong to any of the People; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to shew some example of severe punishment.

For other *Axioms* that preserve this State, they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a *Popular*, and *Tyrannical State*; for the strict kind of *Oligarchie*, is kin to a *Tyranny*.

Preservation of *5 Sophisms.*  
a popular State; *2 Rules or Axioms.*

1. **I**N publick Assemblies and Consultations about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, publick Justice, and Exercise of arms, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an *Oligarchie*. For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies, Magistrates, Offices, War-like Exercises, &c. by mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises.

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath been in some Popular States; but rather to preserve them in all other matters, that concern not the State and publick Government.

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons by Lot, or Balloting, and not to choose any for their wealths sake.

4. To take heed, that no mā bear office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, and salary, &c. is to be reserved in their

their own hands, to be disposed of by a Common-Council, &c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred.

5. That no Magistracy be perpetual, but as short as may be, to wit, for a year, half year, &c.

6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth, to give an accompt of their behaviour and government, and that publicly before the Commons.

7. To have publick Salaries and allowance for their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearly dividends for the common people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts, so they have some aptness to perform that duty.

9. To provide that publick Judgements and Trials be not frequent, and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators, as the law of requital, &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indicted and accused in this Commonwealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State; whereby many times the popular State is turned into an *Oligarchie*, or some other Govern-

ment. Hereto tendeth that Art of Civil Law, made against Accusers and Calumniatours: *Ad Senatus-consultum Turpilianum*, l. i. *de Calumniatoribus*.

10. In such free States as are popular, and have no revenue, to provide that publick Assemblies be not after: because they want salary for Pleaders and Oratours; And if they be rich; yet to be wary, that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Common revenue among the multitude, is like a purse or barrel without a bottom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs.

11. If the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places, and to provide above all, that none do live idly, but be set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Coppisholds, such decayed Citizens.

12. To be well advised what is good for this State, and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State, that seemeth most popular; but that which is best for the continuance thereof: And



to that end, not to lay into the *Exchequer*, or *Common-Treasure*, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it be practised, confiscations, and fines of the Common people would be frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.

### *Conversion of States in general.*

**C**onversion of a State, is the declining of the Common-wealth, either to some other form of Government, or to his full and last period appointed by God.

### *Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular.*

**G**eneral, (*viz.*) 1. Want of Religion: *viz.* of the true knowledge and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of *Saul*, *Merziah*, the Jewish State; the four Monarchies and all other.

2. Want

2. Want of wisdom and good Council to keep the State, the Prince, Nobles, and people in good temper, and due proportion, according to their several orders and decrees.

3. Want of Justice, either in administration (as ill Lawes, or ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self; viz. Of provision, as Armour, Money, Captains, Souldiers, &c. Execution, when the means or provision is not used, or ill used.

2. *Particular*: To be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules, that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealths.

*Particular causes of Conversion of States, are of two sorts.*

1. **F**oreign: By the over-greatness of invasion of some foreign Kingdom, or other State of meaner power,

power, having a part within our own, which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State. This falleth out very seldom for the great difficulty to overthrow a foreign State.

2. *Domestick*: { Sedition or open violence by the stronger part.  
Alteration without violence.

### *Sedition.*

**S**edition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of Arms against the superiour power, *Quasi ditio fecedens.*

*Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.*

*Liberty*

**W**hen they, that are of equal quality in a Commonwealth, or do take themselves so to be, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these three.

1.

*General*

*Reason*

Or, when they are so

Honour

so unequal in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with less respect than those that be of less defect in these three things, or in any of them.

1. **I**N the Chief: Covetousness or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (*viz.*) when the Magistrates, especially the Chief, encrease his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the publick or (private calamity; whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in *Olygarchies*) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrel against the Chief, as in Kingdoms: The examples of *Wat Tyler*, *Jack Straw*, &c.

2. In the Chief: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power, are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as *Coriolanus*, *Cyrus minor*, Earl of *Warwick*. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have over-much, and

and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or less, than they deserve as they suppose; & so in envy and disdain, seek Innovation by open faction, so *Caesar*, &c.

4. Some great necessity or calamity; So *Xerxes* after the foil of his great Army. And *Senacharib* after the loss of 185. in one night.

1. **E**NVIE, when the chief exceed the mediocrity before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him; as *BRUTUS Cassius*, &c. against *Caesar*.

2. **Fear**, viz. Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practice or force, to prevent his own danger, as *Artabanus* did *Xerxes*.

2.  
Particu-  
lar.

3. **Lust or Lecherie**, as *Tarquinius Superbus*, by *Brutus*; *Pisistratida*, by *Armodius*; *Appius* by *Virginus*.

Chief.

4. **Contempt**; For vile quality & base behaviour, as *Sardanapalus* by *Arbaces*; *Dionysius* the younger by *Dion*.

5. Con-

Other de-  
grees

5. *Contumely*, When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit, who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as *Caligula* by *Chereas*.

Other de-  
grees

6. *Hope of Advancement*, or some great profit, as *Mithridates*, *Anobarfanes*.

### *Alteration without violence.*

**C**auses of alteration without violence are; 1. *Excess* of the State; when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was, or should have been settled, and exceedeth in power, riches, and absoluteness in his kind, by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes, and impositions, &c. applying all to his own benefit, without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government, as a Kingdom into a Tyranny, an *Oligarchie* into an *Aristocracie*.

2. *Excess*, of some one or more in the Common-wealth, viz. When some one or more in a Common-wealth grow

grow to an excellency or excess above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or virtue; and so by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the Sovereignty: By which means, popular States grow into *Oligarchies*; and *Oligarchies* and *Aristocracies* into *Monarchies*. For which cause the *Athenians* and some other free States, made their Laws of *Ostracismos*, to banish any for a time that should excel, though it were in virtue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an unjust Law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means, that none should grow to that height and excellency, than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy.

F I N I S.

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METHOD,  
how to make use of  
the Book before, in the  
reading of the Story.



**D**AVID being *seventie*  
*years of age*, was of  
*wisdom*, *Memorie*,  
*&c.* sufficient to govern  
his Kingdom; 1. Reg.  
Cap. 1.

Old age is not ever unfit for  
publick Government.

**D**AVID being of great years, and so  
having a cold, drie, and impotent  
bodie, married with Abishag, a fair maid  
of the best complexion through the whole  
Realm, to revive his bodie and prolong  
his life, 1. Reg. Chap. 1. verse. 3.

Exam-

## Example of the like practise in Charles the fifth.

**D**AVID being old and impotent of body, by the advise of his Nobles and Physicians, married a young maid called Abishag, to warm and preserve his old body.

### Observation.

**VV**Hether David did well in marrying a maid? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man, to marrie a young woman; or on the other side, for an old, worn, and decrepitate woman, to marrie a young and lustie man?

### For the affirmative.

**A**R.G. The end of marriage is Societie and mutual comfort; but there may be Societie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young partie; Ergo, 'tis Lawful.

Ans<sup>r</sup>. Societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage; but none of the principal

ends of marriage : which are :

1. { Procreation of children, and so the continuance of mankind.

2. { The avoiding of Fornication.

As for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man, woman and woman, where no marriage is, and therefore no proper ends of marriage.

## The Negative.

**A**RG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent, and young partie hath no respect to the right end, for which marriage was ordained by God. Therefore it is no lawful marriage.

2. No contract, wherein the partie contracting, bindeth himself to an impossible condition, or to do that which he cannot do, is good or lawfull. But the contract of marriage by an impotent person, with a young partie, bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot do, viz. to perform the duties of Marriage; Therefore it is unlawfull.

For

For the same cause, the civil Law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity of the man, in which case she can have no wrong, being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent, because Volenti non fit injuria: — In legem Julian. de adulteriis leg. Si uxor, &c.

It provideth further, for the more certainty of the infirmity, That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men that have been infirm at the first, by reason of sickness, or some other accident, afterwards proved to be sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis.

## Defence for David, in marrying Abishag.

**I**T was rather a Medicine, than a marriage, without any evil, or disordered affection.

2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles, and Physicians.

3. It was for the publick good, to prolong the life of a worthy Prince.

4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid, who was made ac-

acquainted with the Kings infirmities, and to what end she was married unto him; who if she did it for the common good, and for duties sake, having withall the gift of continencie, she is to be commended; if for ambition, or some vain respect, it is her own, and not Davids fault.

## Political Nobilitie.

### *Adoniah* aspiring to the Kingdom.

**F**irst, took the advantage of Davids affection and kindnesse towards him, and made him secure of any ill dealing.

Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his Father as unfit for Government.

Thirdly, blazed his title, and Right to the Crown.

Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and Footmen, and a guard to make shew of State.

Fifthly, being a comly, and goodly Person, made a popular shew of himself, and his qualities.

Sixt-

Sixthly, joynd to himself in Fadon, Joab, the General of the Arme, who was in displeasure for murdering of Abner, and Amaza, and feared that David would supplie Benajah in his place, and so was discontented. And Abiathar the high Priest, that was likewise discontented with David, for the preferment of Zadoch.

Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under pretence of a vow, and offering at the Fountain of Raguel, in the confines of Judaa.

Eighthly, made a shew of Religion by Sacrificing, &c.

Ninthly, made himself familiar with the Nobles and people, and entertained them with feasting.

Tenthly, drew into his part the chief Officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by rewards, Familiaritie, &c.

Eleventhly, disgraced and abased the Competitour, and such as he knew would take part with him, and concealeth his ambition, and purpose from them.

Twelfthly, had Jonathan a Favorite of the Court, and near about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing were discovered, and moved at the Court, vubilest

whilest himself was in hand about his practise.

## OBSERVATIONS.

Waies of such as aspire to the Kingdom, & marks to discern them.

**F**irst, they wind into the Princes favour by service, officiousness, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practises.

2. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities, age, impotencie, negligence, sex, &c. And work upon that by disabling the Prince, and secret detracting of his State, and Government.

3. They blaze their Title, and claim to the Crown, (if they have any) with their friends and favourites.

4. They provide them in secret of extraordinary forces, and furniture for the wars, make much of good Souldiers, and have a pretence (if it be espied) of some other end, as for the Kings honour, or service, and to be in readiness against foreign enemies, &c.

5. They make open shew of their best qualities, and comeliness of their persons (which though it be vain as a dumb shew, it is very effectual to win the liking of the popular sort, which according to the rule of the election of Kings, in the Bees Common-wealth; think that *Potima est digna imperare*) *Activitie, Nobilitie, Ancestrie, &c.*

6. To have their blazers abroad, to set out their virtues, and to prepare their friends in every Province.

7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto them, of the chief Peers, and men of best qualitie, such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers, and the Militarie men, and most subtile and politick, especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the State.

8. To have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinarie matter in some convenient place, not too near, nor too far off, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspicion.

9. To take up a shew, and pretence of Religion, more than before, and beyond the practise of their former life.

10. They use popular courtesie (which in a great person is verie effectual) feasting, liber alitie, gaming, &c.



11. To be over liberal, and win to them by gifts, familiaritie, &c. the chief Officers of the Court, and Governours of Shires.

12 To have some near about the Prince, to keep them in credite, and remove suspicion, if any rise.

13. To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the Prince, and present State, or to the competitour, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all means they can, and to conceal the designs from them, least they be discovered before they be too ripe.

14. To have some spie near about the Prince, to advertise them if any inckling of suspicion arise, whilst themselves are practising.

Note the practises of Absolom: 2 Sam. chap. 16. And of Cyrus minor in Xenophon; Περικλέα cap. 1.

## Political Prince.

*David* being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom, valour, religion,

and justice, and so highly deserving of the commonwealth, yet grown into age, grew withal into contempt, & had many, both of his Nobles, & common people, that fell from him; first with *Absolom*, then with *Adoniah*, who affected the Kingdom, and rebelled against him: For remedy whereof, he stirred up himself to publick actions, which might shew his vigour and sufficiencie to mannage the affairs of his Kingdom.

1. **A**fter the victorie against *Absolom*, he forced himself to forbear mourning, and shewed himself to his discontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonabte sorrow and lamentation for his son.

2. After

2. After the victorie, he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem, which was a renewing, and re-establishing of him. 2 Sam. 19. 12.

3. He gave an experiment of his power and authoritie, by deposing a person of great authoritie and estimation, to wit, Joab, General Captain of the Armie, and advancing Amasa to his place.

4. He sent kind Messengers to Jerusalem, and to other chief and head towns, and speciall men of Judea, his contributors, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words, That they were of his own flesh and bloud, with protestation of his special love and affection towards them, to provide them with the like kindness and affection towards him.

5. He assembled a Parliament of his whole realm, and took occasion upon the designing of his successour, to commend unto them the succession of his house, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worship and religion then established, and gave a grave and publick charge to his Successour, now designed, touching the manner of his government, and maintaining of religion. 1. Chron. 12. 13.

6. He shewed his bountie and magnifi-

science in congeſting matter for the building  
of the Temple, as gold, ſilver, braſs, &c.  
And cauſed it to be publiſhed and made  
known to the Parliament and whole Na-  
tion, 1. Chron. 22:13.

7 He revived the Church Govern-  
ment, and ſet it in a right order, aſſigning  
to every Church, Officers, his place and  
function.

8. He ſuppreſſed the faction of Ado-  
niah, and ordained Solomon his Succeſ-  
ſor, 1 Reg. 1. 22. By theſe means, he  
retained his Maieſtie and Authoritie in  
his old age, as appeareth by the effect; ſo  
that being bed-rid, he ſuppreſſed the fa-  
ction of Adoniah, (which was grown  
mightie, and was ſet on foot) with but  
bare commandment, and ſignification of  
his pleaſure, and ſo he dyed in peace.



FINIS.